RAWLS'S NEGLECTED CHILDHOOD: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINAL POSITION, STABILITY, AND THE CHILD'S SENSE OF JUSTICE Written with Professor Samantha Brennan, University of Western Ontario In Children to Philosophers (Edited by Garret Matthews and Susan Turner; published by University of Rochester Press.) And The Idea of Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls (Edited by Clark Wolf and Victoria Davion; published by Rowman and Littlefield.) Abstract of Noggle's half of the paper: Rawls's argument for justice as fairness has two parts. In the first part he argues that the two principles of justice as fairness would be chosen by free and equal beings from a fair initial starting point. The second part argues that the two principles are "stable." Part of this argument rests on a conception of childhood and the moral development of children which he borrows largely from Piaget and Kohlberg. In this paper, I will examine the theory of childhood moral development Rawls endorses in A Theory of Justice and ask three questions about it. First, what is the role of this material in A Theory of Justice? Second, why does it seem to mysteriously drop out of the theory as it is presented in Political Liberalism? Third, would it have been worth emphasizing more rather than less? I suggest that if the Rawlsian project were to draw more heavily on child moral psychology, it might be applicable to societies that do not already have a history of liberal institutions.