THE MORAL STATUS OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTS' RIGHTS, AND FAMILY JUSTICE Written with Professor Samantha Brennan, University of Western Ontario Social Theory and Practice, Spring, 1997. This paper has three parts. In the first, we propose several plausible claims that place constraints on theorizing about the moral status of children. We think that these claims embody a common sense and attractive understanding of children's moral status. These constraints appear to be inconsistent. To the extent that they do capture the common sense view of children, that view would seem to be inconsistent. In the second part we offer a rights-based theory of the moral status of children which, we claim, both respects the constraints that define the common sense position and resolve its internal conflicts. Finally, we offer some thoughts on the moral nature of parenting and on how public policy might look if it were it based on the philosophical view we propose.