KANTIAN RESPECT AND PARTICULAR PERSONS Forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Why does respecting persons seem to entail respecting at least some of their ends or desires? I examine three answers. The first comes from Kant, who holds that we must respect a person's ends because they are set by the faculty of rational will, which is the proper focus of moral respect. The second comes from utilitarianism, which sees the need to respect a person's desires as being either a basic postulate or an implication of the fact that persons, whom we must respect, own their desires. After criticizing these two views, I develop a third view. This view, which I call "Kantian Particularism," draws on certain of Kant's but directs our respect not only at a person's status as a rational will, but also at her status as the particular, empirical person that she is. I offer a moral psychology according to which a person's particularity can be described in terms of the structure of her psychology. I then use this psychology to derive practical implications for Kantian Particularism.