A. Subjectivism, as I have presented it here is a meta-ethical theory–i.e. a theory about the nature of moral truth and the ontological status of moral properties.

B. However, subjectivism can also be a first order or normative moral theory. That is, it can also be a theory about the CONTENT of morality.

1. Remember the difference:

a. Meta-ethics is concerned with the nature of moral truth and the ontological status of moral properties (i.e. whether moral properties are real, objective properties that exist independent of us, or whether they are "all in our heads," so to speak.).

b. Normative (or "first-order") ethics is concerned with the content of morality, i.e. with what we’re supposed to do.

c. By the way, in 218, I sometimes fudge and say that moral theory is about the "nature" of morality–this is ambiguous, since it can refer to the general nature of what we are supposed to do, or it can refer to the metaphysical nature of morality itself, i.e. the question of subjectivism versus objectivism and cognitivism versus non-cognitivism.

II. Now, the problem is this: If you take up a scientific world-view, then subjectivism as a meta-ethical position looks right, but if you take morality seriously, subjectivism as a normative theory looks creepy.

A) Why a subjectivist meta-ethics seems more scientific:

1. The scientific world view assumes that everything can be described in purely physical terms, as matter, energy, and so on.

2. However, a moral property does not seem like anything that can be described in such terms, because a moral property–unlike a physical property–is a property about WHAT TO DO.

3. A moral property seems to be a NORMATIVE property, since morality seems to issue commands.  

a.  Words like "moral" and "good" imply a command or at least a suggestion that we should seek them out.  Words like "immoral" or "evil" or "bad" imply a command to avoid them.)

b.  The word NORMATIVE is often used to refer to things that give commands.  To say that moral properties are normative is to say that they carry with them an implicit command.

4.  Now what would it be like for normative properties to be objective?  That would mean that properties of things in the outside world (everything except persons) can issue orders.

5.  A famous critic of this idea is J. L. Mackie, who once called these alleged objective  moral properties "queer" (he did this before the term became a pejorative): they are properties THAT GIVE COMMANDS, and yet, since they are supposed to be objective, they are properties of things in the outside world independent of persons.  It quite odd to think that things in the outside world (the world independent of persons) issue orders.

7.  Boiled down, then, the problem is this:  Moral properties are NORMATIVE (which means that they give commands).  It is odd to think of things out in the world (other than persons) giving commands.  This makes it odd to think of moral properties as being properties of things in the outside world (other than persons). 

8.  The most obvious solution to all of this is to say that moral properties are not real properties of things in the outside world, but rather that they are properties of US.

a. This of course is a form of subjectivism, for it claims that moral properties are subjective properties: that is, properties that exist in the minds of persons.

b. In this way, we avoid having to talk about ting in the outside world issuing commands

c. Instead, it is PERSONS who issue commands, and a moral property is just a property of a person.

9.  This, then, is why the scientific world-view SEEMS to push us toward accepting subjectivism as a meta-ethical theory: It avoids the problem of having to explain how things (other than persons) in the outside world can issue commands in the way that moral properties are supposed to issue commands.

B) Why taking morality seriously makes subjectivism seem creepy

1. If moral judgments do not express beliefs about the world, then it is hard to see how they can be true or false.

a. Another way to say this is to note that according to subjectivism/non-cognitivism (remember that the two normally go together), moral judgments merely express our feelings or attitudes.

b. But of course feelings and attitudes cannot be true or false.

2. In fact, if we believe that moral properties are just attitudes, and that attitudes cannot be true or false in the way that beliefs can, we may be led to adopt subjectivism as a normative theory, i.e. a theory o about what to do.

a. Such a theory would basically say: Do whatever you feel like.

b. Since feelings can never be true or false, it may look as though anything goes.

c. So for example, if your feelings about burning babies differ from mine, then there is no sense talking about whose feelings are true and whose are false, since feelings cannot be true or false.

3. This, of course, makes a mockery of morality. Whatever the content of morality is, it surely is not just do whatever you feel like.

III. This, then, leads us to one sort of very popular project within meta-ethics:

A. That project consists of trying to reconcile the fact that objectivism about moral properties looks unscientific, but that subjectivism as a normative theory (i.e. a theory about what to do) is repulsive.

B. There are a couple of main strategies for dealing with this:

1. Naturalism: the claim that moral properties are objective, and that they are in fact scientific properties as respectable as any other scientific property.

a. In this way we have objectivism but we claim that moral properties are a part of the natural world.

b. In some ways this is what Hobbes tries to do: Morality is just whatever contributes to survival.

2. A rejection of science as the final arbiter of what is real.

a. G. E. Moore does something like this: He claims that moral properties (in particular, the property of GOOD) are objective, but they are simply not "natural" in the scientific sense.

3. Become a moral relativist of some sort and adopt some version of subjectivism as a normative theory on the basis of the claim that this is the only moral theory that is thoroughly scientific.

4. Deny that subjectivism about moral properties must lead to subjectivism as a normative theory (i.e. a theory about what to do).

a. On some readings, this was more or less what Kant was up to.

b. The idea is that moral properties are subjective attitudes, but that there can be correct and incorrect attitudes.

c. This would make moral properties subjective, and yet it would still allow for something like moral truth and moral error.

 

On to the Main Topic at Hand: Normative Ethics, and How to Do It (The "it" referring, of course, to normative ethics, i.e. creating and defending a normative ethical theory)

I. OK, so now on to normative ethics: the question of the "shape" and content of morality, and how we can know it. This question–which is the main question of this course--thus has two parts:

(1) How can we know which moral theory is correct,

(2) Which moral theory IS correct?

II. Why does it matter?

A. Well, as we mentioned before, it makes a great deal of difference to how we should live if we are to live a moral life.

B. In this class, we will spend most of our time looking at three main approaches to moral theory: egoism (like Hobbes), deontology (like Kant), and consequentialism (like Mill’s utilitarianism).

1. Now each of these theories differs from the others in various ways.

2. The theoretical differences are easy enough to see (in fact, PHL 218 is mainly about these differences):

a. Egoism claims that morality is mainly about enlightened self-interest, and that it consists of rules that will be of benefit to the individual agent herself.

b. Deontology claims that morality is a matter of making sure that one's actions do not violate certain rules.

c. Consequentialism claims that morality is a matter of maximizing some moral goal, such as total net happiness.

3. Now these theoretical differences may seem abstract, but it is crucial to see each of the three approaches to moral theory implies a very different answer to a very important question.

4. That question is: HOW MUCH DOES MORALITY DEMAND OF US?

a. This question is closely related to several others:

i. How good do you have to be in order not to be bad?

ii. How much of one’s own time, energy, resources, and life does morality require me to devote to being a moral person?

iii. What is the relation between morality and self-interest?

iv. How much of my own energy, time, and resources can I devote to my own self-interest and still be a morally good person?

v. How much do morality and self-interest conflict?

5. The three main moral theories give very different answers to these questions:

a. Rational Egoism makes a very minimal demand:

i. According to rational egoism, morality just IS self interest, and so there is no conflict between morality and self-interest.

ii. Morality cannot take away from my own self interest, since morality is just a very clever way of trying to get the things I want most in the first place.

iii. So if I devote a lot of time and energy toward being a moral person (on this theory), I am at the same time promoting my own interests, since morality is, by definition (again, according to rational egoism) a means of promoting my long term self-interest.

iv. If I fail to be moral, I am only hurting myself, since morality is a method of securing my own best interests.

b. Consequentialism is at the other end of the spectrum.

i. For now, at least, when we talk about consequentialism, you can just think "utilitarianism"

ii. As some of you saw in 218, utilitarianism makes unlimited moral demands.   (The notes to this part of 218 are on the course web site, if you want to go back and refresh your memory about this stuff.)

iii. Utilitarianism–like other forms of consequentialism–gives us a mandatory moral goal: To maximize total net happiness.

iv. Utilitarianism does not does limit the extent to which each of us must sacrifice our own happiness to maximize the total happiness.

v. Thus, for example, if I could send a dollar to Oxfam and prevent a case of river blindness, then utilitarianism seems to imply that it is immoral for me to spend that dollar on a beer.

vi. If we take this reasoning to its logical conclusion, it appears that utilitarianism does not allow us to do anything except those things that would maximize happiness.

vii. If ever we are tempted to have any sort of fun, we should ask whether there is anything that we could do that would increase the total happiness more than the fun thing we are contemplating doing.

viii. Since there will usually be something better to do, it appears that utilitarianism requires us to surrender our entire lives to the duty to maximize happiness, and thus never to have any fun.

ix. In short, Utilitarianism does not SEEM to place any Limits on morality, since it seems to put no limit on how much of our own happiness we may be required to sacrifice in order to maximize happiness.

c. Deontological theories like Kant’s give us a lot of moral "elbow room".

i. We only have to follow some rules and do at least a little bit to help others.

ii. So long as we do that, we can then do pretty much whatever else we want.

iii. But consequentialist theories like utilitarianism give us a moral goal that we must adopt if we are to be moral.

iv Consequentialist theories make morality very demanding, since they make a sort of Moral Project mandatory for everyone.

v. Deontology does not do this

vi. Yet on the other hand, deontology does not simply let you do whatever is in your long-term best interest–there are rules to follow, and these rules can conflict with your self-interest..

______________________________________________________________________

rational egoism         Hobbes                             minimal

deontology                Kant                                 moderate

consequentialism     Mill                                     extreme

A. It determines just how much we are required to do in order to be a moral person.

B. Of course, if we don’t care about being a moral person, then we won’t care about this.

C. However, most of us DO care about morality, and it is probably wise to do so.

D. So for those of us who are not simply willing to say to hell with morality, the question is a very pressing, very practical, one.

 

I. Now this problem is even more difficult because it is not clear how to go about answering it.

A. Questions about morality are not like questions of science–we cannot do an experiment or make an observation or derive a formula to get the answer.

B. In fact, questions about how to KNOW the right answer to the question are just as difficult as the question of which theory is right in the first place.

II. Good and bad ways to select a moral theory:

A. So how should we go about deciding which moral theory is the right one?

1. Now of course we could just pick a theory at random.

2. Or we could pick the one that is the easiest to read or understand. (That leaves out Kant, I suppose.).

3. Or we could pick the theory of the person we admire most. So we might read Mill’s autobiography and his work with Harriet Taylor in which they defend feminism, and we might adopt Mill’s theory out of admiration.

4.  Or we might pick the theory that is most easy on our egos.  Thus we might reject consequentialism and adopt egoism.

5.  Or we might take the Aristotle-Goldilocks approach:  Egoism is too permissive, consequentialism is too demanding, but deontology is JUST RIGHT.

6. Now of course all of these are bad reasons to adopt a theory. Silly, in fact. But what else can we do?

B. What we need is some good rationale for adopting one moral theory instead of another.

C. To put it another way, we need some sort of EPISTEMIC OR JUSTIFICATORY METHOD for determining which moral theory is correct.

1. Such a method might

a. allow us to build a moral theory from the ground up

b. evaluate and criticize an existing moral theory

c. select the correct or at least most correct moral theory from the list of possibilities

2. Such a method will work by showing us how to justify, defend, prove, support, establish, or ground moral claims and/or theories;

3. In short, it will show us how to tell the difference between correct and incorrect moral claims and/or theories

III. As it turns out, there are a number of different EPISTEMIC METHODS for justifying/proving/.supporting/establishing/grounding moral claims/theories.

IV. By far the most common rationale for accepting one moral theory over another is what I called on the first day the INTUITIONISTIC METHOD OF MORAL THEORIZING.

I. As I said earlier, the basic idea behind the intuitionistic method of justification of moral claims/theories is that we have some moral beliefs (intuitions) that we just cannot bring ourselves to doubt.

II. We use these intuitions as axioms to build a moral theory, or as data to test such a theory.

III. According to this method of moral theorizing, the fact that a moral theory agrees with our intuitions is a point in favor of it.

IV. Conversely, the fact that it disagrees with our intuitions is a point against it.

I. Intuitionism grew out of a certain–somewhat outdated–conception of how rational inquiry is to be conducted.

A. For those of you who know about the history of philosophy, the rationalist project–associated with people like Descartes and his followers–thought that rational inquiry was like geometry: you start with a set of self-evident axioms and derive theorems BY DEDUCTION.

B. The rationalists attempted to apply this "geometric method" to the sciences and to morality.

C. The rough idea was that if we start with true foundations and build up our knowledge from them via the truth-preserving principles of deductive logic, we would arrive at certain knowledge about whatever we were inquiring about.

1.  In case you haven't taken logic, deductive logic involves rules that are "truth preserving."  That means that if you start with true premises, and if you apply the rules of deductive logic correctly, then you are guaranteed to arrive at true conclusions.

2.  Here's an example:  The law called "modus ponens" is a law of deductive logic.  It goes something like this:  (P) + (if P then Q) = Q.  (That's not how you write things in deductive logic, but you should see the point:  If you know that P is true, and if you know that (if P is true then Q must be true), then you AUTOMATICALLY know that Q is also true.  So long as those first two things are true, Q MUST BE TRUE.

D. On this view of rational inquiry, moral intuitions would play the same role that axioms play in geometry:

1. They are supposed to be the self-evident foundations of everything else.

2. So they would be something like Descartes's clear and distinct ideas: something that you cannot doubt, and which are thus a safe foundation for building new and certain knowledge.

E. Now because the idea of a moral intuition came out of this tradition, early ideas about moral intuitions reflected the parallel with geometrical axioms: they are supposed to be clear, and indubitable truths.

II. For a while, moral philosophers used intuitions in this way–as basic axioms on which to build moral theories

III. However, there were critics. The most important was probably Henry Sidgwick, who examined much of the work going on at the time and declared it to be shoddy.  (His book, The Methods of Ethics, is one of the most important books on the methodology of ethics:  A lot of what we will discuss in this course has roots in Sidgwick's work.)

A. He claimed that a moral intuition–in order to do the job it was supposed to do (i.e. to provide a clear and certain foundation for moral knowledge)–had to meet four conditions:

1. It had to be clearly and precisely formulated

2. It had to be self-evident on careful reflection

3. It had to be consistent with other intuitions that met this test

4. All experts had to agree to its truth.

B. The problem, as Sidgwick saw it, was that most people using moral intuitions at the time were using intuitions that were either

(1) vague or imprecise, or

(2) not really self-evident